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vii
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http://www.wayner.org/books/pogs/
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http:/www.wayner.org/books/pog/
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10
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Hash functions are
pure blenders that accept a file
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Hash functions are
pure blenders that accept a string of bits
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10
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.. are MD5 and its
newer cousin the Secure Hash Algorithm
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... are MD5 and it's
newer and stronger cousin, the Secure Hash Algorithm
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...The nature of
hash functions means that only someone who knows this can generate this
value. It should be practically impossible to start with $h(key| file)$
and the file itself and find the value of the $key$.
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It should be
practically impossible to start with $h(key| file)$ and the file itself
and find the value of the $key$. In many simple cases, it should also
be practically impossible to create a value of $h(key,file)$ without
knowing $key$. A more sophisticated protocol known as HMAC offers more
strength.
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Some avoid this
problem by applying the DES algorithm two or three
times with different keys effectively doubling or
tripling the size of the key.
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Some avoid this
problem by applying the DES algorithm three
times with different keys effectively
tripling the size of the key.
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In simple cases when
public key algorithms like RSA are used, digital signatures will be
denoted as $f_d(x)$ where $d$ is the decryption key which is normally
kept private. If hash functions are used, the digital signature
will be denoted as $h(key,x)$ where the value of $key$ must be known to
compute it.
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In simple cases when
public key algorithms like RSA are used, digital signatures will be
denoted as $f_d(x)$ where $d$ is the decryption key which is normally
kept private. This privacy offers a degree of
\newterm{non-reputability}, a term that means that it's difficult for
someone to deny signing a document. If hash functions are used, the
digital signature will be denoted as $h(key,x)$ where the value of
$key$ must be known to compute it. Both the signer and the verifier
must know the same value of $key$ preventing any non-repudiation.
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If you need more
understanding,
please consult the basic references like the {\em Handbook of Applied
Cryptography} .
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If you need more
understanding,
please consult the basic references like the {\em Handbook of Applied
Cryptography} or {\em Modern Cryptography}.
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1.01
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